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The existence of parallel imports (PI) raises a number of interesting policy and strategic 
questions, which are the subject of this survey article. For example, parallel trade is 
essentially arbitrage within policy-integrated markets of IPR-protected goods, which may 
have different prices across countries. Thus, we analyze fully two types of price 
differences that give rise to such arbitrage. First is simple retail-level trade in horizontal 
markets because consumer prices may differ. Second is the deeper, and more strategic, 
issue of vertical pricing within the common distribution organization of an original 
manufacturer selling its goods through wholesale distributors in different markets. This 
vertical price control problem presents the IPR-holding firm a menu of strategic choices 
regarding how to compete with PI. Another strategic question is how the existence of PI 
might affect incentives of IPR holders to invest in research and development (R&D). The 
global research-based pharmaceutical firms, for example, strongly oppose any relaxation 
of restrictions against PI of drugs into the United States, arguing that the potential 
reduction in profits would diminish their ability to innovate. There is a close linkage here 
with price controls for medicines, which are a key component of national health policies 
but can give rise to arbitrage through PI. We also discuss the complex economic 
relationships between PI and other forms of competition policy, or attempts to limit the 
abuse of market power offered by patents and copyrights. Finally, we review the 
emerging literature on how policies governing PI may affect international trade 
agreements. 
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1. Introduction 
  This chapter surveys the primary literature on a particular aspect of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) that is crucial for competition but heavily understudied to date.  As 
described elsewhere in this volume, various forms of IPR, including patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, plant variety rights, and other policies, protect the exclusive rights of their 
owner to produce, sell, import, and license their goods and technologies or to use specific 
identifying marks and brand names.  However, for purposes of achieving the desired 
policy balance between ownership rights and consumer access, numerous limitations are 
placed on the exercise of IPR.  For example, patented medicines may be subject to 
compulsory licensing, protected plant varieties may be used by rival firms under a 
research exception, and copyrighted published materials may be copied for educational 
purposes, under the fair use doctrine.  The scope of exclusive rights versus the extent of 
such limitations is largely a matter of national discretion, subject to the minimum 
expectations set out in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
  Among the most important of such limitations is the exhaustion doctrine.  This 
doctrine, which is explained more fully in the following section, simply states that at 
some point the owner of an IPR may no longer control distribution of a good that it had 
legitimately placed on the market.  For example, once a patent or trademark owner sells a 
protected commodity within the United States she no longer can control its distribution 
because first sale within the country exhausts original ownership rights, which are 
transferred to the buyer.  Similarly, distribution rights are exhausted upon first sale   3
anywhere within the European Union.  However, both U.S. and EU policy prohibit 
imports of such goods from outside their territories. 
  Once exhaustion applies, it becomes legal for any interested party to sell or give 
away the goods he has purchased within the region of application.  Because such 
transactions occur in channels that are outside the distribution system of the original IPR 
owner, they are referred to as either “gray market trade” (in the United States) or “parallel 
imports” (in the EU and most of the world).  The terminological difference reflects 
territorial variations.  There are no “imports” within the United States, but there is 
unauthorized parallel exchange among exclusive territories, hence the term gray market.  
Within the EU, however, such goods are traded across national borders.  In this chapter 
we will refer to this process as parallel imports (PI) or parallel trade, noting here that 
most of the analysis holds equally for intra-regional trade within a nation. 
  The existence of PI raises a number of interesting policy and strategic questions, 
which are the subject of this chapter.  For example, parallel trade is essentially arbitrage 
within policy-integrated markets of IPR-protected goods, which may have different 
prices across countries.  Thus, we analyze fully two types of price differences that give 
rise to such arbitrage.  First is simple retail-level trade in horizontal markets because 
consumer prices may differ.  Second is the deeper, and more strategic, issue of vertical 
pricing within the common distribution organization of an original manufacturer selling 
its goods through wholesale distributors in different markets.  This vertical price control 
problem presents the IPR-holding firm a menu of strategic choices regarding how to 
compete with PI.     4
  Another strategic question is how the existence of PI might affect incentives of 
IPR holders to invest in research and development (R&D).  The global research-based 
pharmaceutical firms, for example, strongly oppose any relaxation of restrictions against 
PI of drugs into the United States, arguing that the potential reduction in profits would 
diminish their ability to innovate.  There is a close linkage here with price controls for 
medicines, which are a key component of national health policies but can give rise to 
arbitrage through PI.  We also discuss the complex economic relationships between PI 
and other forms of competition policy, or attempts to limit the abuse of market power 
offered by patents and copyrights.  Finally, we review the emerging literature on how 
policies governing PI may affect international trade agreements. 
Thus, in this chapter we review the analytical literature on exhaustion and PI.  In 
Section 2 we discuss briefly some basic introductory concepts.  We then turn to the legal 
framework governing parallel trade, including within international trade agreements.  In 
Section 3 we consider models of price discrimination and retail arbitrage through PI, 
including implications for quality of goods.  In Section 4 we analyze the possibility of 
wholesale arbitrage through vertical organization of distribution channels.  In Section 5 
we review the literature on PI and incentives to engage in R&D.  Finally, in Section 6 we 
consider the limited empirical evidence available on the determinants and impacts of 
parallel imports.  Concluding remarks are in Section 7. 
2. Basic Economic and Legal Concepts and the Exhaustion Doctrine 
Almost all legally produced (i.e., not counterfeited) goods are sold with the 
benefit of some form of intellectual property rights.  Pharmaceutical products, for 
example, generally begin life with patent protection in one or more countries.  New   5
machinery and transport equipment embody numerous technologies in their component 
parts that may also be patented.  Digital products, such as music recordings on compact 
disks and software, are sold under copyrights.  New cinematic films and television 
broadcasts similarly have exclusive rights under copyright protection.  Fashion goods and 
cosmetics are marketed in different countries with the benefit of trademarks, brand names 
and logos.  Indeed, many products incorporate a complex mix of numerous IPR.   
Medicines, for example, may be patented but are sold by licensed companies bearing the 
rights to use registered brand names and trademarks.  Microsoft’s software products 
embody patents, copyrights and brand names. 
Classic “intellectual property goods”, such as pharmaceuticals, seed varieties, 
books, recordings, computer software, wines, and high-end cosmetics, share a number of 
important characteristics.  First, it generally requires a significant investment of capital 
and engineering to invent or create the intellectual asset itself, such as a chemical 
formulation, genomic tool, symphony, platform computer program, or quality and 
reliability reputation.  Next, taking that idea or expression and converting it into 
commercially useful products also involves substantial and costly investments in 
organizing production facilities, testing, labeling, marketing, and distribution.  These 
features together imply that there typically are large upfront fixed costs in invention, 
creation and innovation.   
However, once these fixed costs are paid and the good is ready for market, the 
actual marginal production and distribution costs are comparatively small.  Drugs are 
produced at very low per-unit cost, once the formulation is perfected.  Computer software 
may be distributed electronically at virtually zero cost.  The actual monetary costs of a   6
fashionable shirt or the ingredients in a bottle of perfume may be just pennies, in relation 
to the per-unit value of the trademark under which it is distributed.   
The obvious implication of this combination of high fixed costs and low marginal 
costs is that free riding through imitation, unauthorized copying, and trademark 
counterfeiting is likely to be endemic in countries without strong IPR protection.  The 
essential and familiar point of IPR is to provide innovators with exclusive production and 
marketing rights in order to support prices above marginal distribution costs, thereby 
earning a return that compensates for the costs of investing in new ideas, cultural goods, 
and reputations.  Without it, the development of new technologies and goods would be 
severely curtailed. 
A less obvious, but no less important, implication is that innovators have a strong 
incentive to sell their IPR-intensive goods at different prices to different types of 
consumers.  There are always “impatient” consumers who are willing to pay higher prices 
for more rapid delivery or product versions with higher quality characteristics and there 
are always “patient” consumers who would prefer to economize through waiting or 
accepting less quality.  Countries, or various groups within countries, similarly may 
display different demand functions for information goods and cultural products.  Given 
these differences, innovator firms clearly would prefer to differentiate their prices, terms, 
or access to raise their aggregate returns to investment.  If, for example, a music producer 
can sell compact disks at a lower price in poor countries than in rich countries, it would 
prefer to do so as long as those lower prices cover marginal costs and generate more 
consumption.   7
The legal principle governing whether, in fact, firms can segment markets in order 
to support price discrimination across countries in goods protected by IPR is the 
exhaustion doctrine.  In brief, it means that, once a product is placed legitimately onto 
one market, the rights to prevent further distribution across national borders without 
authorization may be exhausted or sustained.  Where such secondary international 
distribution occurs without authorization by the original rights holder, the activity is 
termed parallel imports or gray-market imports.      
  The exhaustion doctrine is a fundamental component of each country’s IPR 
regime.  With strong rights to preclude parallel trade, firms can segment markets and 
deploy price differentiation that should raise profits.  Without them, markets become 
more integrated and firms suffer a diminished ability to set discriminatory charges.   
These differences matter for marketing strategy, the vertical organization of distribution, 
and investments in future research and development (R&D). 
2.A. International Differences in the Exhaustion Doctrine   
  Before we proceed to the economics of parallel imports, it is useful to provide 
fundamental perspective on the variations in the legal treatment of PI across countries.
3  
Exhaustion policies vary widely as may be seen in Table 1.  The European Union asserts 
regional exhaustion in all fields of intellectual property within the Community but 
excludes PI coming from outside member states.  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
consistently has upheld the view that, under the Treaty of Rome, free circulation of goods 
takes precedence over IPR.  This principle of legally unrestricted arbitrage extends to 
goods that may be on the market in different countries due to varying price controls, 
including pharmaceutical products, despite the evident conflict between trade policy and 
                                                 
3 This discussion summarizes the extensive treatments in Maskus (2000) and Fink (2004).   8
public-health policy.  Thus, national governments within the EU cannot use differential 
price mandates to justify restrictions on PI.  An important exception is that if products are 
placed on the market under a compulsory-licensing order, they may not be parallel 
traded.  A further exception is that the first showing of a film or television broadcast does 
not exhaust distribution rights within the EU. 
  Policy in the United States follows a mixture of regimes.  Under the first-sale 
doctrine, rights to control redistribution of all IPR-protected goods are sold upon initial 
transaction within the country.
4  Regarding PI in trademarked goods, US law sets out a 
“common-control exception,” under which trademark owners are permitted to bar PI 
except where both the foreign and domestic firms are in a parent-subsidiary relationship 
(Palia and Keown 1991; National Economic Research Associates 1999).  The notion is 
that if a parent cannot control its owned distributors there is no rationale for the customs 
authorities to act in their behalf, a point upheld by the Supreme Court in K Mart 
Corporation v. Cartier (486 US 281, 1987).  Moreover, to exclude PI a trademark holder 
must demonstrate that the imported goods are not identical in quality to the original 
products and could cause confusion among consumers.  The situation is different for 
patents and copyrights. Patent owners in the United States are protected against PI by an 
explicit right of importation.  Neither may copyrighted goods be parallel imported under 
terms of the Copyright Act of 1976. 
  The difference in treatment is natural when one considers the legal basis of the 
underlying IPR mechanisms.  Patents and copyrights are designed explicitly to provide 
monopoly rights so that the inventor or creator can recoup the costs of investment.   
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software, which may not be resold without permission.   9
Accordingly, the ban on PI simply forms a component of the exclusivity, or scope, of 
those rights.  Trademarks, however, in the law exist as a guarantee to consumers that the 
firms using the marks were the ultimate origin of goods sold.  Parallel imports are, in 
fact, legitimate goods that were originally sold under the trademark.  If no consumer 
confusion would result then PI amount to another distribution channel for authentic 
commodities since parallel imports are not counterfeit but genuine goods. 
  Japan allows PI in patented and trademarked goods unless they were explicitly 
barred from parallel channels by contract provisions or unless their original sale was 
subject to foreign price regulation.  In copyrights it pursues an open PI regime except for 
motion pictures, representing the lobbying power of its movie industry.  Overall, Japan’s 
case law makes that country much more open to PI than the United States (Abbott 1998).   
Australia generally permits PI in trademarked goods but patent owners may block 
them.  In 1998 Australia ended protection from PI for copyrighted compact disks and did 
so later for digital video disks.  
Finally, India has international exhaustion in trademarked and patented goods, but 
largely blocks PI in copyrighted items.  Again, this reflects the strength of the local film 
industry, plus growing interests in software protection.  Generally, few developing 
nations restrict PI in any field of protection, reflecting in part the absence of broader 
competition policies and the existence of stricter limitations on the exercise of intellectual 
property rights than are found in the United States and EU.  
2.B. International Agreements on Exhaustion 
  Despite lengthy negotiations, it proved impossible in the deliberations leading to 
the TRIPS Agreement at the World Trade Organization to reach a global consensus on   10
exhaustion policy.  Countries with strong export interests in intellectual property, 
primarily the United States, pushed for a global regime of national exhaustion in patents 
and copyrights, which would have banned parallel imports anywhere.  Major developing 
countries and some developed countries were unalterably opposed to such a restriction, 
particularly in light of perceived needs to have access to PI in medicines.  As a result, 
Article Six of TRIPS essentially states that each country is permitted to establish its own 
rules on exhaustion, subject to the condition that it do so on the basis of non-
discrimination, as enshrined in the national treatment and most-favored-nation principles. 
  It is not surprising that a global rule on PI could not be reached.  Indeed, this is 
precisely the point of the model in Richardson (2002).  He demonstrated in a multiple-
country model with Nash bargaining that neither a regime of full international exhaustion 
(a uniform global price), nor a regime of full national exhaustion (segmented markets), 
could be sustainable in equilibrium.    
  Some agreements have been reached in the context of preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs).  As noted above, the EU has a region-wide exhaustion policy, 
which is particularly interesting in light of the recent accession of lower-income 
transition economies in Eastern and Central Europe.  In contrast, the language of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains no explicit reference to 
exhaustion, suggesting that the policy is left up to individual members.  However, in its 
recent negotiations of PTAs with Central America nations, Peru, Colombia, Jordan, 
Morocco and Vietnam the United States has made it a priority that its trading partners   11
restrict parallel imports in pharmaceuticals (Maskus, 2006).  This provision, one of the 
so-called “TRIPS-Plus” features of bilateral trade agreements, is highly controversial in 
developing countries. 
2.C. Competition Law and Parallel imports 
A policy of national exhaustion, banning parallel imports, amounts to a 
government-supported segmentation of international markets.  As we will analyze in 
detail later, IPR-owning firms would take advantage of this situation through profitable 
price differentiation.  Even in the absence of a legislated ban, however, firms might write 
contracts with distributors that prevent them from engaging in PI or selling to parallel-
trading companies.  Such vertical restraints with the effect of geographically partitioning 
markets are sometimes considered incompatible with competition law.  In the United 
States, for example, it is generally illegal for an exclusive territorial distributor to 
discriminate between potential customers in order to deny supplies to gray-market 
channels.  Correspondingly, market-sharing agreements between horizontal competitors 
in different locations are generally illegal per se and considered to be a serious 
infringement of competition rules in both the United States and the European Union.  In 
addition, one particular aspect of EU competition law is that it dictates that unilateral 
behavior of a monopolist, or a firm in a dominant position, that restricts cross-border 
trade and segments markets geographically is typically abusive and, thus, illegal. 
Because the issue has been more active in European courts, we treat the situation 
there more fully, followed by a brief discussion of US practice.
5  To begin, EU law 
prohibits certain types of price discrimination by a monopolist, specifically if it puts one 
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trading partner (e.g., a wholesale distributor in one location) at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to other trading partners.  Article 82 of the EC Treaty states that 
price discrimination of this kind is abusive and hence illegal.  A pricing strategy that is 
harmful to the single market is considered to be a particularly serious infringement of this 
Article and prices charged to prevent or limit the scope for parallel imports or exports are 
condemned.  This stance is indicated in the following court finding. 
“The influence of the pricing policy of operators active on a national 
market on that of operators active on a neighboring national market is of 
the very essence of a common market. Anything which restricts that 
influence must therefore be regarded as an obstacle to the achievement of 
that common market and prejudicial to the outcome of effective and 
undistorted competition, especially with regard to the interests of 
consumers. Accordingly, where such obstacles are brought about by an 
undertaking holding a dominant position, it is in principle appropriate to 
conclude that this is a case of abuse incompatible with Article 86 of the 
Treaty (now Article 82 EC).”
6 
 
More generally, the relevant EU case law on dominant firm pricing can be 
summarized in three principles (Whish, 2003).  First, a monopolist cannot charge 
excessive prices to impede parallel imports. This principle was established in the British 
Leyland case in 1984.
7  The European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that BL, which was a 
dominant firm, refused to supply traders planning to re-import (that is, parallel import) 
certain cars into the UK with certificates of uniformity, though the imports had been 
certified by the National Transportation Authority (NTA).  Further, when it began issuing 
such NTA certificates BL charged parallel-importing firms fees that were discriminatory 
and disproportionate to the value of the service provided. These charges impeded parallel 
trade and were, consequently, illegal. 
                                                 
6 Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities (1999).  
7 84/379/EEC: Commission Decision of 2 July 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/30.615 - BL)   OJ L 207, 2.8.1984.   13
Second, a monopolist can only price-discriminate across geographical markets to 
a limited extent and the price-discrimination must be "objectively" justified. In United 
Brands the ECJ found that UBC abused its monopoly power by charging different prices 
depending on the final destination of its products.
8  Since UBC sold its products to 
distributors at two common locations (Rotterdam and Bremerhaven) and not in different 
local markets across Europe it was entitled to take local market conditions into account 
only to a limited extent.  Similarly, in Tetra Pak II the court ruled that geographic price 
discrimination by the dominant firm was unacceptable and incompatible with the single 
market since the relevant market was the entire EU and the price differences charged 
across different locations lacked objective justification.
9 
Third, it is illegal for a monopolist to give rebates that impede imports or exports. 
Rebates that target competition across borders ("border rebates") are incompatible with 
the EC Treaty.  According to the European Court of Justice's finding in Irish Sugar, the 
competitive spillovers across borders are the very essence of a common market.
10  In 
Michelin II the court found that a rebate scheme designed by a dominant firm to 
discourage cross-border purchases within the EU is illegal.
11 
In addition to restricting the pricing behavior of a dominant firm, EU law 
prohibits other types of unilateral behavior that partition the internal market.  For 
instance, unilateral behavior that raises the cost of cross-border arbitrage or limits the 
scope for such trade is potentially an infringement of Article 82.  In the Deutsche Post 
                                                 
8 Case 27/76 ECR 207, United Brands 1978.  
9 Case ECR-I/5951, Tetra Pak II, November 1996.  
10 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 7 October 1999. - Irish Sugar plc v 
Commission of the European Communities: “The grant, by an undertaking holding more than 88% of the 
relevant market, of special rebates to certain customers exposed to competition because of their location 
along a border, constitutes an abuse contrary to Article 86.” 
11 Case ECR T-201/01, Michelin II , September 2003.   14
case, the Commission found that this firm had abused its dominant position in the 
German letter market by intercepting, surcharging and delaying incoming international 
mail.
12  Deutsche Post had abused its dominant position in the German market for the 
delivery of international mail in four ways: (i) discriminating between different 
customers, (ii) refusing to provide its delivery service, (iii) charging an excessive price 
for the service offered and (iv) limiting the development of the German market for the 
delivery of international mail and of the UK market for international mail bound for 
Germany.  
In another case the Commission found that the pharmaceutical company 
AstraZeneca infringed Article 82 by abusing public procedures and regulations in a 
number of countries.
13  The abuse was a pattern of misleading representations made 
before patent offices in a number of member states in connection with the company’s 
applications to extend patent protection of the drug Losec.  It also deregistered its market 
authorization for Losec in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  At the time, generic products 
could only be marketed and parallel importers could only obtain import licenses if there 
were an existing reference market authorization for the original corresponding product.  
Finally,  Clearstream was found to infringe Article 82 of the EC Treaty by 
refusing to supply cross-border securities clearing and settlement services to Euroclear 
Bank SA.
14  Clearstream held a dominant position for providing cross-border clearing 
and settlement services in Germany to intermediaries situated in other EU member states. 
Its behavior qualified as an abusive refusal to supply because the company’s services 
                                                 
12 Deutsche Post AG II - Case COMP/36.915 (OJ L 331, 15.12.2001). 
13 COMP/37.507 - Generics/Astra Zeneca. 
14 COMP/38.096 – Clearstream.   15
were essential and it had the effect of impairing other firms’ ability to provide efficient 
cross-border clearing and settlement services to clients in the EU market. 
Turning next to the United States the issue surrounds whether pricing restraints 
have the effect of limiting grey-market exchange.  Within the United States the 
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and subsequent guidelines issued by the Federal Trade 
Commission define illegal forms of price discrimination.  This Act essentially bars the 
setting of differential prices across markets and customers if doing so is anti-competitive 
and injures competition.  Subsequently courts have stated that conditions of competition 
are paramount and that price discrimination reflecting legitimate cost differences, or that 
does not otherwise interfere with antitrust principles, is acceptable.   
As interpreted later by the courts, in essence price differentiation is acceptable 
unless it injures or threatens to injure competition.  In one principal case, a tobacco 
company was accused of violating Robinson-Patman by giving volume discounts for 
generic cigarettes to some wholesalers and not to others, which might have had the 
predatory effect of driving the less-favored distributors out of business.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant because no causal link to injured 
competition was established.
15  In another, a major gasoline company was accused of 
limiting competition by providing a subsidy to some distributors that might have driven 
other sellers out of the market.
16  Finally, as noted earlier, U.S. law prohibits territorial 
distributors from discriminating across customers in an attempt to limit competition. 
2.D. Preliminary Matters on the Economics of PI 
                                                 
15 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209, no. 92-466 (1993). 
16 Texaco v. Hasbrouck 496 U.S. 543, no. 87-2048 (1990).     16
As defined earlier, parallel imports are unauthorized distribution across borders of 
goods protected by intellectual property rights in the recipient nation.  Thus, PI 
constitutes arbitrage that exploits either a retail price differential between two markets or 
a markup between the wholesale price in one country and the retail price in another that is 
sufficient to cover the costs of procuring it from distributors in the former and shipping it 
to the latter.  In this section we consider models of retail arbitrage. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to make two clarifications.  One relates to the term 
“parallel trade” and the other relates to the persistence of the phenomenon.  First, 
arbitrage can either be profitable or unprofitable for the original manufacturing firm that 
holds the IPR.  Our main focus in this chapter, however, is on arbitrage that is 
unprofitable for the manufacturing firm and therefore unauthorized.  The manufacturing 
firm prefers to use only profitable, and hence authorized, distribution channels.  In our 
opinion it is sensible to restrict use of the term parallel imports to unprofitable 
(unauthorized) cross-border trade and use the broader term “international arbitrage” for 
both profitable and unprofitable trade. 
Second, arbitrage can either have temporary or persistent equilibrium effects. 
Economic shocks can permit sudden arbitrage opportunities across markets.  In 
particular, exchange-rate fluctuations and demand shocks create incentives for 
international arbitrage and parallel trade in some situations. The effect of this type of 
arbitrage is normally temporary, however.  Parallel imports can also have persistent 
effects because they constitute an important restriction on pricing power by the holder of 
intellectual property rights.  Indeed, the scope for unauthorized international arbitrage is   17
one important factor that determines the market equilibrium.  The economic literature has 
focused on this latter category. 
Economic theory has considered three theoretical settings in which parallel trade 
can be a problem for a firm that manufacturers a good protected by IPR and uses 
independent firms to market and distribute the product in different countries.  In the first 
category of models, which is the subject of the following section, parallel trade is 
horizontal arbitrage that limits the scope for international price discrimination (Malueg 
and Schwartz, 1994).  A firm with market power has an incentive to set prices across 
markets that reflect differences in willingness to pay for its good. The difference between 
prices in two markets cannot exceed the cost of parallel trade. Parallel imports in this 
framework typically have a negative effect on the manufacturing firm’s profit.  
The second category of models, discussed in Section 4, consider parallel trade as 
a response to differences between retail and wholesale prices that arise as a result of 
vertical price control (Chen and Maskus 2005; Ganslandt and Maskus 2007a).  A 
monopolist that uses selective, independent distributors that have market power in 
national markets must consider several conflicting interests.  It has an incentive to induce 
optimal consumption in each market and also an incentive to obtain cost-efficient 
distribution.  Parallel imports give rise to a profit-reducing pro-competitive effect in the 
import market.  It also makes distribution of goods inefficient since costly trade replaces 
more cost-efficient local distribution. 
In the third category of models parallel trade has an effect, directly or indirectly, 
on the provision of local services.  We do not discuss these further in the paper and 
therefore provide a brief review here.  Retailers provide costly pre- and post-sale   18
services, such as advertising, test drives, quality assurances, and warranties and the costs 
of these services must be recovered through some exclusivity.  Parallel trade can 
undermine the scope for pricing that permits the retailer to recover such costs.  It can thus 
be argued that the provision of services is likely to be suboptimal when cross-border free-
riding on services occurs (Telser 1960; Perry and Porter 1986; Chard and Mellor 1989).  
Parallel imports cause a related problem when services are provided by 
independent distributors with market power in national markets (Mathewson and Winter, 
1984).  The manufacturing firm wishes to give distributors incentives to provide the 
optimal level of services and induce the optimal level of consumption in retail markets.  
By limiting the profitability of such investments, parallel trade becomes a horizontal 
externality that may result in suboptimal retail prices.  The manufacturing firm could 
charge a higher wholesale price to solve this problem but this strategy would have a 
negative impact on the incentives for the retailer to provide services.  Consequently, the 
resulting equilibrium is suboptimal for the manufacturing firm.  
 
3. Price Discrimination and Retail Arbitrage 
Firms with market power have an incentive to set prices that reflect the economic 
valuation of specific consumers.  Revenues increase when a firm has the ability to extract 
more consumer surplus by setting separate prices for each group of consumers.  Such 
price discrimination boosts profits and is desirable from the firm’s point of view.  It 
requires, among other things, that the scope for arbitrage is limited.  Unrestricted, 
frictionless arbitrage among consumers facing different prices would eliminate any price 
differential and thereby force the firm to set uniform prices.    19
3.A. The Economics of Third-Degree Price Discrimination 
Third-degree price discrimination refers to the existence of prices that differ 
across groups of consumers, with each group distinguished by a common elasticity of 
demand.  This situation most closely characterizes the fact of internationally segmented 
markets, with perhaps a single price in each country.  Parallel trade in such retail markets 
clearly limits the scope for international price discrimination.  Permitting PI implies that 
the price differences between geographical markets are limited to the costs of trade, 
including trade barriers, between them.  The scope for international third-degree price 
discrimination is, therefore, far greater in the context of national exhaustion than in a 
regime of international exhaustion of intellectual property rights.  
Economic theory demonstrates that firm profitability is generally positively 
related to the scope for third-degree price discrimination in international markets 
(Krugman, 1986), at least in the absence of commitment problems and strategic 
interaction among firms.  The welfare results of price discrimination are, however, less 
straightforward and the net effect on society is typically theoretically ambiguous.  It 
follows that the overall welfare impacts of PI, which limits the scope for price 
discrimination, are also ambiguous.   
The ambiguous welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination depends on two 
factors with offsetting influences.  On the one hand, different retail prices cause a 
misallocation of consumption as marginal valuations across markets diverge.  On the 
other hand, global consumption is potentially higher as consumers in more price-sensitive 
markets can afford to buy the good.     20
A necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to result in a 
reduction of total “Marshallian” welfare is that total consumption is larger or equally 
large with a uniform price.  Put differently, price discrimination can increase total welfare 
if total consumption increases, otherwise it cannot (Pigou 1920; Robinson 1933).   
Schmalensee (1981) proves this conjecture for constant marginal costs.  Varian (1985) 
extends the proof to incorporate imperfect arbitrage.  Schwartz (1990) shows that, by 
revealed preference, the same result holds for increasing returns to scale.  
The intuition for the basic result is that the misallocation of consumption with a 
uniform price is less than with price discrimination, since the marginal valuations in all 
markets are equalized.  The effect of price discrimination can thus be positive only when 
the total consumption increases, otherwise the impact must be negative due to the 
misallocation of consumption.  It should be noted in this context that the result is static 
and depends crucially on prices being costlessly equalized.  Wasteful arbitrage or free-
riding may potentially alter the welfare conclusion. 
  The comparison of total consumption with price discrimination and with a 
uniform price is crucial for the basic welfare result stated above.  The next question is 
whether third-degree price discrimination can increase consumption and if this expansion 
is sufficiently large to dominate the negative effect of diverging marginal valuations in 
different markets.  It has been shown that total consumption can expand under price 
discrimination for several reasons.  Some of these are particularly important in the 
context of intellectual property rights, where goods have significant development costs 
and very low marginal costs, generating substantial returns to scale.    21
The second possibility is that price discrimination permits the manufacturing firm 
to open new markets in countries where the marginal value of the good is significantly 
lower than the prevailing price in existing markets.  If the manufacturing firm is forced to 
charge a uniform price it may not be worthwhile to serve price-sensitive consumers and 
markets with very high price elasticities of demand.  Price discrimination may 
consequently Pareto-dominate a uniform price when it establishes additional markets, 
because both consumer surplus and producer surplus rise. 
The tradeoff between misallocation of consumption due to diverging marginal 
valuations and the possibility that price discrimination opens new markets indicates that 
the welfare benefits of price discrimination are positively related to the size of differences 
across markets.  Substantial differences in valuation and elasticity of demand increase the 
risk that a uniform price leaves significant consumer groups and markets unserved.  This 
possibility raises the issue of the welfare effects of price discrimination and arbitrage in a 
multi-market context, meaning a situation with more than two markets.  This case is 
clearly relevant for international trade. 
Malueg and Schwartz (1994) present a model with a continuum of countries and 
compare price discrimination, a uniform price, and a mixed regime with uniform prices in 
subsets of markets but potential price discrimination between different groups of markets.  
Their model has linear demand and a constant marginal cost.  The total output is therefore 
independent of the degree of price discrimination as long as all countries are served.  
Consequently, price discrimination is only desirable if it opens new markets.  Not 
surprisingly, demand in countries must be significantly different for price discrimination 
to increase welfare compared to a uniform price.  More interestingly, they show that a   22
mixed regime with uniform prices within groups of markets and price discrimination 
across groups increases welfare compared to either a uniform price or price 
discrimination across all countries.  The intuition for this result is that the misallocation 
due to price differences between countries can be reduced, without risking that total 
output is diminished, if markets with relatively similar demands are grouped together.  
This result may accordingly suggest that it could be socially optimal in global terms to 
have regional IPR exhaustion within groups of countries with similar demand 
characteristics (e.g. the European Union or developing countries in a preferential trading 
area) but to permit third-degree price discrimination across groups, as long as significant 
international differences in income and wealth persist. 
3.B. Profitable Arbitrage and Second-Degree Price Discrimination 
The previous section was devoted to third-degree price discrimination, or 
differential prices set across markets.  In that context we noted that a firm with market 
power has an incentive to price discriminate between distinct geographical markets, while 
the welfare effects of such conduct are ambiguous.  One important feature of models of 
third-degree price discrimination and retail arbitrage is that parallel trade does not 
actually arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.  The price difference between two markets 
is limited to the trade costs between them but arbitrage would actually never occur.  It is 
always more profitable for the firm to set prices to make arbitrage unprofitable than to set 
prices that would give rise to parallel trade. 
In markets with heterogeneous consumers the situation is quite different.  In 
particular, consumers in the same country may have different arbitrage costs and different 
valuations for a good.  The firm can choose to set prices in two markets to induce self-  23
selection; that is, it can engage in second-degree price discrimination.  Self-selection and 
the scope for this form of price discrimination open the possibility that the firm’s profit 
increases if international consumer arbitrage is permitted.  Further, parallel imports arise 
in equilibrium.  We turn to this problem next. 
Anderson and Ginsburg (1999) develop a model with two countries and 
heterogeneous consumers.  They show that a firm with market power may have an 
incentive to create a second market in the second country, even if there is no is local 
demand there, in order to price discriminate across consumers in the first country.  Note, 
however, that arbitrage must be limited across consumers in the same country for such 
price discrimination to be sustainable.  The intuition for Anderson and Ginsburg’s basic 
result can be easily understood with a simple example.  Assume two distinct groups exist 
in one market and the first group, with inelastic demand, has a prohibitive arbitrage cost 
while the other, with elastic demand, has a low, but positive, trade cost.  A monopolist 
can increase its profit by opening a market in a second country with a lower price.  The 
low-cost arbitrageurs would serve only consumers with a high valuation in the domestic 
market, since their own valuations remain low.  It is fairly straightforward that the 
monopolist would benefit from a lower arbitrage cost on the part of this second group as 
long as the first group has a prohibitive arbitrage cost.  A reduction of the arbitrage cost 
in the group of price-sensitive consumers allows the firm to raise the price in the foreign 
market and thus increase its revenue. 
Another example that illustrates that a firm with market power can gain from 
arbitrage is the model by Raff and Schmitt (2007).  They show that a monopolist can 
benefit from parallel trade in a situation when demand is uncertain with respect to   24
quantity, and is also different across countries, while excess inventories have little value.  
Parallel trade in this setting has two functions.  It potentially increases competition 
between retailers but it also increases the expected value of inventories, since excess 
supplies can be sold to other markets.  Banning parallel trade can cause prices to fall 
drastically when retailers have large stocks on hand and demand is low.  This effect 
reduces the retailers’ incentive to order large volumes and potentially has a negative 
effect on the manufacturing firm’s profitability.  Allowing parallel trade, on the other 
hand may keep retail prices from falling sharply even when the state of demand turns out 
to be low.  This effect raises the incentives for the distributors to order larger volumes 
and could consequently increase profits of the manufacturing firm. 
 
4. Vertical Price Control Models and Parallel Imports 
  While it is natural to conceive of PI as arbitrage against retail or horizontal price 
differences across countries, survey evidence suggests that the bulk of such trade happens 
at the wholesale level (NERA 1999).  This is true of consumer goods, such as compact 
disks, wearing apparel, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and automobiles.  It is also true of 
intermediate goods, including certain kinds of machinery, chemicals, and bulk syrup for 
soft drinks.  Indeed, wholesale-level trade is conducted both by independent but licensed 
distributors and parallel trading companies that specialize in the activity.   
As noted by Ganslandt and Maskus (2007a) there are three primary reasons why 
retail-level arbitrage is not large.  First, there are likely to be significant costs associated 
with finding reliable supplies for parallel trade and getting goods across borders.  If fixed 
costs of such activity are even modest we would not expect consumer arbitrage.  Second,   25
there may be complementary services that are sold with the physical goods, such as 
calling plans for mobile phones.  Third, consumer-level parallel trade may simply be 
illegal for purposes of safeguarding public health.  This is the case for pharmaceuticals in 
the EU, for example, and for alcoholic beverages in the United States.  Regarding 
medicines, firms engaged in parallel trade must achieve approval to import from health 
authorities, requiring substantial costs for certification.  Thus, the simple idea that 
manufacturers exercise price discrimination at the retail level and individuals elastically 
trade on the extra-cost margins is misleading.  Instead, firms sell to wholesale 
distributors, which then deal with retailers.  The bulk of PI is then sourced at the 
distributor level.   
Under many circumstances efficient distribution requires permitting the IPR 
holder a significant degree of vertical control over the operations of its licensees.   
Multinational enterprises build markets through establishing exclusive dealership rights 
in various territories.  Exclusivity makes it easier to monitor marketing efforts and 
enforce product quality.  However, it may be difficult or illegal in foreign markets to 
enforce private contractual provisions prohibiting sales outside the authorized distribution 
chain.  Seen in this light, restrictions against parallel trade are a required complement to 
exclusive territorial rights (Chard and Mellor 1989). 
Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) and Chen and Maskus (2005) first developed a 
theory of PI and vertical price control (VPC).  In their conception, a manufacturer 
protected by IPR in both a home and foreign market has one independent distributor in 
each location.  The firm needs to set its wholesale prices within two-part tariff contracts 
in order to induce profit-maximizing retail prices, which vary according to demand   26
elasticity.  They assume that there can be one-way PI from the distributor in one market 
to the other, though not in the other direction.  Where PI exist, or there is a threat of PI, 
the distributors compete in Cournot fashion.  The two-part tariffs extract all extra-normal 
profits from the distributors to the manufacturer.   
In this framework a number of tradeoffs arise.  First, the PI coming into one 
market generates a pro-competitive effect there, reducing profits.  Second, the need to 
limit or even deter this competition affects the wholesale price in the export market, 
causing a double-markup problem there.  Finally, the act of parallel trade incurs real 
resource costs, also reducing profitability.  Put simply, the manufacturer has two 
instruments, the specific wholesale prices, to deal with three problems, leading inevitably 
to inefficiencies in distribution.   
Their essential conclusions can be summarized as follows.  First, starting from a 
situation of very low unit trade cost, an increase in those freight charges reduces parallel 
imports.  At the same time, the manufacturer raises its wholesale price in the export 
market to further limit PI and enhance the profit gains in the import market as 
competition becomes less severe.  At some point the distributor price in the exporter 
becomes sufficiently high to deter PI altogether, though the potential for such imports 
still affects prices.  As trade costs rise toward the prohibitive level that segments markets, 
the manufacturer is able to reduce its wholesale price toward the efficient vertical level.  
The implication is that an IPR holder would set distributor prices in different markets that 
follow an inverted-V shape in underlying trade costs.  This is an empirical prediction that 
we review later in the paper.   27
The authors find that the manufacturer’s profits are U-shaped in trade costs.  They 
fall with an initial increase in cost because even though parallel trade diminishes, the cost 
of PI rise from zero and there remain pro-competitive and double-markup problems.  As 
PI are deterred profits start to rise until they achieve their maximum at full segmentation.  
As for welfare, which is the sum of profits and joint (two-country) consumer surplus, it 
also exhibits a U shape.  Consumers jointly are best off at zero trade costs and a 
maximum PI volume, which causes retail prices to converge.   Note that this situation 
reflects a difference of impacts on consumers in the two nations, with those in the import 
market enjoying lower retail prices and those in the export market suffering increases, as 
in standard arbitrage models.  The fact that welfare is U-shaped suggests that PI are likely 
to be beneficial when trade costs are low but harmful when trade costs are intermediate or 
high.  Thus, permitting PI may enhance well-being within regional trade agreements, 
especially those that work to reduce transactions costs on mutual trade.      
  This analysis has been extended in a pair of papers by Ganslandt and Maskus 
(2007a, 2007b).  The first paper noted a failure of the Chen-Maskus models to account 
fully for the strategic effects of imperfect competition at the distributor level as trade 
costs diminish.  These authors work carefully through the first-order conditions that 
capture, respectively, the pro-competitive effect (“horizontal externality” in their 
terminology), the double-markup effect (“vertical externality”) and the existence of trade 
costs.  They demonstrate the rather curious outcome (assuming there is no retail 
arbitrage) that, as unit trade costs fall toward zero and PI volume increases, the 
manufacturer in fact would react by raising his wholesale price in the import market even 
as he reduces the wholesale price in the export market.  The reason is that it is profit-  28
maximizing in an increasingly integrated market to push one of the distributors out of the 
market by raising the price it is charged, leaving the joint region open for the remaining 
distributor.  The implication is that an open regime of PI, coupled with declining trade 
costs, could push an endogenous concentration of the distributor market while inducing 
price divergence rather than convergence.  The authors argue that this may be one reason 
for the observed failure of retail prices within the EU to move together as much as 
authorities had hoped in recent years.  A further implication is that joint welfare may be 
maximized at a moderate level of trade costs, arguing for leaving some “sand in the 
gears” if PI are legal.  
  Ganslandt and Maskus (2007a) recognize that their model is stylized and consider 
particular extensions.  Permitting retail arbitrage limits the scope for price divergence but 
does not eliminate it at modest trade costs.  Permitting product differentiation and price 
competition (rather than quantity competition) also retains a flavor of the basic results, 
though they are weakened.  Additional work along these lines would be useful. 
  The second paper (Ganslandt and Maskus 2007b) offers a comment on the 
wisdom of a competition-policy rule stating that manufacturers cannot discriminate 
among their distributors by setting differentiated wholesale prices.  In essence, this rule 
reduces the number of instruments to one without removing the underlying market 
problems, including the IP holder’s market power and the resource waste in PI.  It turns 
out that, while a uniform price can be beneficial in welfare terms for low trade costs and 
legalized PI, at higher trade costs the policy forces the firm to induce higher retail prices 
in both markets than would exist with price discrimination.  Under reasonable 
circumstances, then, a well-meaning competition regime of open parallel trade and non-  29
discrimination among wholesalers can have negative welfare consequences.  The authors 
extend this analysis to the case of two-way parallel trade and the basic results remain 
intact. 
  As a theoretical matter, much remains to be done in the analysis of VPC models 
with parallel trade.  As noted, no serious treatment of price competition or product 
differentiation has appeared yet in the literature.  More fundamentally, no analysis has 
been applied to the case of multiple markets or the implications of differential PI regimes 
in preferential trading arrangements.  Finally, more work needs to be done to analyze the 
endogenous strategic responses of IPR owners to international variations in exhaustion 
policies.  One might expect, for example, that in countries that are potential sources of PI 
international firms owning IPR would acquire their distributors or build their own 
distribution markets, rather than work with independent wholesalers.
17  Such predictions 
are also ripe for empirical testing. 
 
5. Parallel Imports and Investments in R&D 
  As noted above, the existence of PI ordinarily should reduce the profits made by 
an original manufacturer owning some form of intellectual property.  Because profits are 
the basic return to investments in new technologies and products, inventive firms would 
correspondingly take the legal treatment of PI into account in determining their R&D 
programs.  Indeed, one of the major arguments made against parallel trade is that it would 
diminish investments in new technologies.  This claim is prominent in the U.S. debate 
over whether to legalize re-imports of pharmaceuticals from Canada and Western Europe.  
                                                 
17 In a different context, Raff and Schmitt (2005) showed that trade liberalization would encourage 
multinational firms to establish exclusive national territories.   30
Research-based pharmaceutical firms lobby strenuously to forestall implementation of 
such legislation.  More generally, inventive firms in any IPR-based industry would 
oppose the liberalization of restrictions on PI, as described by Barfield and Groombridge 
(1998).  For example, major music labels were strongly opposed to the liberalization of 
import barriers in Australia in 1998 (Maskus 2000).   
  Despite such claims, the formal economics literature on this point is scarce.  We 
review a few papers on this subject in the first sub-section.  After that we note the strong 
linkage between price regulations, R&D, and parallel trade, especially in pharmaceutical 
products. 
5.A. Basic Models of R&D and Parallel Trade 
  The first paper to marry the concept of PI competition to incentives for R&D in a 
theoretical model is Li and Maskus (2006).  They worked within the VPC model set out 
by Maskus and Chen (2002) but added an R&D stage prior to the competition between 
distributors.  Thus, in an initial stage the manufacturer makes a decision on how much to 
invest in a technology that will reduce its marginal production costs, if successful.   
Depending on the amount of R&D, the firm sets out its vertical price structure with its 
distributors either on the basis of a high marginal cost or a low marginal cost.  The 
difference in these costs and prices matters for the volume and impacts of PI.  Their 
essential conclusion is that the legal permission of PI would surely reduce final-stage 
profits of the manufacturer, leading it to invest less up front.  However, the extent of this 
profit reduction, and the impact on R&D, depends on market parameters, including the 
transportation cost in parallel trade.  Accordingly, despite the reduced innovation it is not 
the case that legalizing PI necessarily reduces welfare, rather it can raise aggregate well-  31
being if trade costs are small.  At larger transport costs, however, the combination of 
resources wasted in cross-hauling trade and diminished investment tends to reduce 
economic welfare.  These insights were extended to a more general context in Li (2006), 
while similar results were found for product innovation in Li and Robles (2005). 
In a different competitive framework, Valletti (2006) shows that a policy that 
dictates a uniform price, for instance as a result of global exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights, in an innovative market increases welfare ex post but may reduce ex ante 
investment in R&D.  More specifically, the uniform price raises static welfare but 
reduces investment in research if market-segmented price differentials were based on 
differences in demand elasticity.  However, legalized PI under cost-based differences in 
prices would yield the opposite effects.  In a related paper, Valletti and Szymanski (2006) 
build on the Malueg-Schwartz (1994) framework and detect a welfare tradeoff in which 
international exhaustion can raise static welfare but reduce investments in product 
quality.   
5.B. Price Controls and Parallel Trade 
It is evident that government price controls in different countries can generate 
parallel imports.  In some cases, notably in markets for pharmaceutical products, national 
governments choose quite different policies (Danzon 1997).  Some countries adopt strict 
price caps that are substantially lower than prevailing prices in other countries.  Parallel 
trade responds to these price differentials and products flow from countries with lower 
regulated prices to markets without price regulations or with higher regulated prices.  
Parallel trade has several effects in a situation with price regulations.  First, it 
reduces the price gap between markets.  Second, it changes the incentives for innovative   32
firms to undertake costly R&D.  Finally, it potentially could put pressure on the price 
regulations of different countries, tending toward policy harmonization.  Clearly parallel 
trade in markets subject to price regulations imposed by national governments has 
different effects than arbitrage in situations in which the manufacturing firm can adjust 
prices without considering binding price caps.   
In principle, parallel imports of products that are price-regulated in export markets 
can cause international prices to converge to a low average price level.  From a public-
health standpoint, countries that impose strict price caps are focused on affording their 
patients (or national health systems) cheap access to available products, primarily 
essential prescription drugs, and to maximize static consumer surplus.  Countries that do 
not regulate prices have a relatively higher valuation of innovation and new products and 
accept that IPR may cause static dead-weight losses in return for dynamic innovation 
gains.   
In this context, Rey (2003) takes government policy as given and shows that 
parallel trade causes retail prices in unregulated markets to fall and reduces the incentives 
to invest in R&D.  Danzon (1998) argues strongly against the notion that PI could 
generate welfare gains.   She claims that international price discrimination reflects 
differences in elasticity of demand, corresponding to Ramsey pricing.  Such 
discrimination, supported by market segmentation, is therefore optimal from a social 
point of view.  She makes the informal argument that (p. 293): 
“Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals does not yield the normal efficiency 
gains from trade because countries achieve low pharmaceutical prices by 
aggressive regulation, not through superior efficiency.  In fact, parallel 
trade reduces economic welfare by undermining price differentials 
between markets.”  
   33
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) analyze a price regulation backed by the threat of 
compulsory licensing.  In a two-country model, they show that a manufacturing firm has 
an incentive to sell a high-quality product in the unregulated high-priced market and a 
low-quality product in both markets.  For a low enough price cap the firm prefers to sell 
two variants to selling a single product. The threat of compulsory licensing ensures that 
consumers in all markets will be served and thus removes the potential negative static 
welfare effect of parallel trade, which is exit from markets with a low willingness to pay. 
The quality of the product provided in regulated low-price markets may nevertheless be a 
problem.  Indeed, there is a tension between the producer and the government that 
imposes the price cap.  The producer has an interest to supply a product with very low 
quality while the government has an interest in higher quality provided at the regulated 
price.  
Grossman and Lai (2004) show that government policies are often strategic 
substitutes in an international context.
18  Generous incentives for innovation in one 
country reduce the interests of other countries in providing similar support.  If one 
country offers strong patent rights and unregulated prices, other countries are tempted to 
free ride on the dynamic impacts by providing weaker patents and imposing price caps to 
capture static consumer-surplus gains.  
  In a subsequent paper, Grossman and Lai (2006) introduce price controls and 
show that PI can change the government policy equilibrium.
19  Parallel trade reduces the 
scope for international free-riding on global public goods and weakens the incentives to 
impose aggressive price regulations to maximize static consumer welfare.  A low price 
                                                 
18 This model is discussed at length in the chapter by Edwin Lai in this volume. 
19 See also Pecorino (2002).   34
cap in one country reduces incentives for R&D investment worldwide.  Arbitrage 
consequently makes government policies interdependent and forces every government to 
consider the consequences of its price regulation on global incentives to invest in new 
products.  In fact, this effect can be so important that, in their model, permission of PI 
strengthens the incentives for innovation and global investment in research increases. 
  As in the case of vertical price control models of PI, the literature on this kind of 
arbitrage and dynamic innovation incentives is in its infancy.  Considerably more 
research could be devoted to fleshing out relevant market characteristics that would affect 
the returns to R&D under parallel trade.  This analysis would add much to our 
understanding of complementarity and substitutability among IPR, competition 
regulation, and innovation policies.  
 
6. Empirical Studies of Parallel Imports 
  With the growing analytical attention paid to parallel trade, one might expect a 
flowering of empirical research on its determinants and impacts.  However, empirical 
literature is quite scarce, for the simple reason that data on parallel imports largely are 
non-existent.  This is because customs authorities in individual countries that permit PI 
view such imports properly as perfectly legitimate, even though they arrive through 
unauthorized channels.  As such, distributors of PI pay any required tariffs and meet 
import protocols but there is no customs-related purpose in collecting specific figures on 
parallel trade.  The one exception, discussed further below, is that public health 
authorities need to be able to track the origins of medicines and other goods that may 
affect health status.  Thus, health ministries may ask customs authorities to designate   35
particular import transactions as parallel imports.  However, such data are almost 
exclusively confidential and unavailable to researchers. 
5.A. Survey Evidence 
  In the absence of such data, empirical research has relied either on business 
surveys or indirect measures of the predicted influences of PI.  Regarding surveys, there 
is only one comprehensive survey available of recent vintage.
20  This was performed by 
National Economic Research Associates (NERA 1999), which was retained by the 
European Commission to analyze the potential implications of a proposed EU decision to 
deregulate barriers against PI in trademarked goods from outside the region, a policy 
decision that has not yet been taken.   
  For this purpose NERA surveyed managers of many trademark-owning firms 
across numerous sectors, trying to ascertain their understanding of how extensive PI are 
in the EU.  The survey found that intra-EU parallel trade accounted for varying shares of 
sales in ten industries in 1993, though there is reason to suspect the figures were under-
reported by respondents.  Parallel imports attained their largest shares in compact disks 
(10-20 percent of EU sales), cosmetics and perfumes (up to 13 percent), and soft drinks 
(up to 15 percent), which are generally traded in bulk syrup form.  Each of these types of 
commodities reflects characteristics giving rise to the potential for PI.  Compact disks are 
copyrighted goods subject to substantial increasing returns, fashion goods are subject to 
heavy marketing (and potential free riding), and soft drinks are intensive in the use of 
trademarks.  Other sectors with significant intra-EU parallel trade included automobiles, 
                                                 
20 An earlier survey of PI in the United States is in Hilke (1988), who reported substantial amounts of such 
imports entering the economy in the period following a rapid increase in the international exchange value 
of the US dollar.     36
consumer electronics, clothing, and confectionery.  The survey did not cover 
pharmaceuticals.   
5.B. Indirect Price Studies 
  While survey evidence is informative, it is not useful for statistical analysis, 
which must be performed at the detailed product-level or firm-level given the nature of 
the competition involved.  The first attempt to analyze PI econometrically was made by 
Maskus and Chen (2004).  Their interest was to test their vertical price control model, 
which was possible in principle by looking at the international distribution of wholesale 
prices.  Specifically, the VPC model predicts that an original manufacturer would set 
wholesale prices that follow an inverted V in the level of trade costs.  For this purpose, 
they considered U.S. export unit values in a cross-section of 26 highly disaggregated (10-
digit Harmonized System) commodities in 1993, arguing that they are the closest variable 
readily available that captures wholesale prices.  For example, they developed data on the 
prices of motorcycles with very specific performance characteristics that were exported 
to a number of international markets.  Extreme prices were eliminated from the analysis.   
  The authors regressed the export prices (both in raw FOB form, and adjusted for 
tariff and freight charges to foreign borders) on importer per-capita income, a control fro 
product heterogeneity, and a Herfindahl index capturing local wholesale distribution 
concentration.  Also included were the main variables of interest: the U.S. tariff rate for 
the good and that tariff rate squared.  These tariffs were considered the measure of trade 
costs from the VPC model, which would predict a positive linear coefficient and a 
negative coefficient on the squared tariff.  Their econometric estimates bore out this 
expectation, with both coefficients being highly significant.  Moreover, the coefficients   37
on dummy variables for various exporting regions were higher for areas that permit 
parallel trade, suggesting that U.S. manufacturers set higher prices there to deter such 
competition.  They interpret their results to support the vertical price model of PI.   
    This result is highly suggestive and should spur additional work on the 
determination of price setting across markets.  However, it can be criticized on a number 
of grounds.  Perhaps most significantly, use of the U.S. tariff rate as the measure of trade 
costs does not really capture the essence of those costs in the model, which should vary 
by distance and product characteristics.  Incorporation of a more direct measure, the ratio 
of CIF to FOB prices, substantially reduced the significance of the findings. 
  A second attempt along these lines is in Ganslandt and Maskus (2003).  Much of 
that report is devoted to theoretical analysis of PI, both in terms of horizontal arbitrage 
and the VPC model.  They note, in fact, that a simple horizontal model would generate a 
coefficient pattern that is distinctive from that noted above for the VPC theory.   
Specifically, there would be no negative coefficient on the squared trade cost in the case 
of horizontal arbitrage. They compared these predictions with detailed export unit values 
within the European Union, where PI are more prominent than the United States.  They 
found mixed support for both models.  The VPC model seemed especially relevant for 
export price-setting by manufacturers in high-priced economies, such as Denmark, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, which set lower export prices in nearby economies 
than in more distant places, controlling for local demand characteristics.  
  Taking these studies together, there seems to be good initial support for the 
existence of multiple causes of parallel trade, at least as it would be reflected in wholesale 
(export) price data.  The evidence suggests that vertical control strategies may be   38
particularly important in this context.  However, because these studies are based on price 
measures of all goods (rather than specific PI volumes or prices) they must be taken with 
a grain of salt.  There is certainly more room for research in this area.  A particularly 
valuable exercise would be to analyze the international distribution of prices in a spatial 
model of PI in multiple markets. 
5.C. A Direct Study of PI Competition in Drugs 
  Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) offer the only statistical analysis that actually 
employs data on parallel imports and prices of original manufacturer’s goods.  They 
gained access to detailed product-level data on prescription-drug sales in Sweden from 
1994 to 1998, with prices existing on a bi-weekly basis.
21  They estimated the impacts on 
original manufacturers’ prices of brand-name prescription drugs of entry into the Swedish 
market by firms that brought in identical drugs through parallel channels from other 
markets in the EU.  In this context, Sweden was an ideal natural experiment, for it had to 
switch from national exhaustion to regional exhaustion when it joined the EU in 1995.  
After 18 months, by mid-1996, PI were entering Sweden and by 1998 such sales 
comprised up to two-thirds of the market for large-volume drugs.   
  Ganslandt and Maskus set out an econometric model in which changes over time 
in the ex-factory price of manufacturers’ drugs were affected by entry of PI firms, 
controlling for product fixed effects and other price determinants.  The authors also took 
pains to control for the endogeneity of PI entry to domestic market size and prices.  In 
their instrumental-variables estimation they found that original prices are sensitive to this 
competition, with the reduction in relative pricing power rising as more firms entered, up 
                                                 
21 The data were provided by the Swedish Health Ministry.   39
to four entries.  Overall, the pricing power of brand-name firms was reduced by 12 to 18 
percent on average due to PI competition, suggesting a strong price-moderating impact. 
  The last paper is noteworthy for the care it takes with the statistical analysis and 
the quality of the data used.  However, much more research should be done to develop a 
full picture of what drives parallel imports and the impacts they have on important 
variables.  For example, there is no econometric study available that considers the 
potential effects on R&D decisions of IPR-owning firms, a considerable gap in the 
literature. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
  In this chapter we discussed essential legal and economic issues surrounding 
parallel imports, also called gray-market trade.  This is a significant form of competition 
within the European Union and across regional territories in the United States.  It remains 
a controversial policy question at the global level as well.  For example, the United States 
Congress continues to flirt with the idea of opening the country’s borders to PI of 
medicines from Canada and Western Europe, in the face of intense lobbying from 
pharmaceutical companies. 
  The formal analytical literature on parallel trade is emerging rapidly, focusing on 
horizontal arbitrage, vertical price control models, the role of price regulations, and 
impacts of legalized PI on investments in research and development.  At present these 
models rely on specific assumptions and most could be usefully generalized.  They do, 
however, set out a number of important insights about what drives PI and how such trade 
affects market competition.  Perhaps most interesting are emerging models demonstrating   40
that combining PI with other forms of competition policy, such as mandated uniform 
distributor prices, can be counterproductive in terms of market integration and consumer 
welfare.   
Also important are new insights about the ambiguous effects PI play in the R&D 
area.  If prices are otherwise uncontrolled, a free regime of parallel trade interferes with 
firm strategy and would reduce investments in innovation.  However, where such trade 
interacts with national variations in price controls, its existence changes the bargaining 
dynamics between firms and governments.  It is possible that a mix of price caps and PI 
can increase global R&D incentives, which may be of interest in the international debate 
over access to essential medicines.  However, none of these predictions have been faced 
with empirical investigation. 
From the standpoint of global policy, one issue of vital importance has not been 
addressed in this chapter, largely because it is covered in detail elsewhere in the 
volume.
22  Specifically, restraints on parallel trade may be a central component of 
attempts to distribute essential medicines to poor countries.  As noted in Ganslandt, et al 
(2001), there are substantial dynamic and static externalities in this area and it is 
important to separate innovation incentives from distribution needs.  Assuming that 
sufficient financial and technical resources can be deployed to develop important new 
drugs for diseases of poor countries, it will become increasingly important to ensure that 
those drugs, targeted for specific markets, do not escape into higher-income locales 
(Brown and Norman 2003).  Here, truly, is an area in which policy regulating parallel 
trade requires deep thought and careful implementation. 
 
                                                 
22 See the chapter by Lacroix and Liu.   41  42
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Table 1. Summary of Exhaustion Regimes 
 
Country Trademarks  Patents  Copyrights 
European 
Union 
Community exhaustion  Community exhaustion  Community exhaustion 
      
United 
States 
National exhaustion limited by 
common control and no consumer 
confusion 
National exhaustion  National exhaustion 
      
Japan International  exhaustion  unless 
agreed by contract or original sale is 
price-controlled  
Same as trademarks  International  exhaustion 
except for motion pictures 
      
Australia  International  exhaustion  National exhaustion unless sold 
by patent owner without clear 
restrictions 
National exhaustion except 
for compact disks and 
books 
      
India International  exhaustion  International exhaustion  National  exhaustion  with 
exceptions 
Sources: Maskus (2000). 